Abstract. We study efficient and robust implementations of an atomic read-write data structure over an asynchronous distributed message-passing system made of reader and writer processes, as well as a number of servers implementing the data structure. We determine the exact conditions under which every read and write involves one round of communication with the servers. These conditions relate the number of readers to the tolerated number of faulty servers and the nature of these failures.
1. Introduction.
1.1. Background. Assigning a value to a variable or fetching a value from a variable are probably the most common instructions of any program. When several programs cooperate to achieve a common task, it is natural to provide them with means to perform those instructions through shared variables.
The atomic read-write data structure allows concurrent processes, each possibly running a different program, to share information through a common variable, as if they were accessing this variable in a sequential manner. This abstraction, usually called an atomic register or simply a register, is fundamental in distributed computing and is at the heart of a large number of distributed algorithms [16, 5] .
We study distributed implementations of this abstraction in an asynchronous message-passing system with no actual physical shared memory: instead, a set of server processes provide the illusion to a set of reader and writer processes (clients) that the abstraction is a physical memory accessible to the client processes. We consider robust [4] implementations where any read or write invocation by some client process eventually returns, independently of (a) the operational status of other clients: all of them might have stopped their computation (this aspect of robustness is also called wait-freedom [16] ); and (b) the failure of some of the servers. Such implementations have recently attracted a lot of interest as they underly reliable distributed storage systems [25, 2, 17] , which constitute appealing alternatives to traditional centralized storage infrastructures.
Ensuring both atomicity and robustness is not trivial. Informally, atomicity requires that, even though each read or write operation may overlap and take an arbitrary period of time to complete, they appear to execute at some indivisible instant during their respective period of execution [18] . This requires ordering operations in a way that respects their real-time order as well as the expected sequential specification of a read-write data structure: namely, a read should return the last written value.
To illustrate how an implementation can be robust yet achieve atomicity and motivate our quest for fast implementations, consider the classical implementation This would clearly be optimal in terms of time-complexity. Besides theoretical interest, such implementation might for instance be of practical relevance in the context of distributed storage systems where fast access to shared information might be of primary importance [1, 7, 29] .
Clearly, the difficulty is related to the multiplicity of readers. With a single reader, it is easy to modify the algorithm of [4] such that the read takes only one round-trip [18] : the read can return the latest value learned from the servers in the first round trip, provided it is not older than the value returned in the previous read. Otherwise, the reader returns the same value as in the previous read. Since there is only one reader, this clearly orders the reads and ensures atomicity. To illustrate this case, suppose the writer writes v with timestamp ts, and the write message is received only by one server s (the write is incomplete). The first reader gets information from a majority of servers that includes s. The read must return v because the reader does not know whether the write of v is complete or not, and this reader has to return the value of the last preceding write. Consider now the situation with two readers. The second reader invokes a read, queries a majority of servers, and misses s. Clearly, the second read returns a value with a timestamp lower than ts, violating atomicity: the second read returns an older value than the preceding read.
At first glance, it seems impossible to have a fast implementation with two readers when any minority of servers can be faulty. But what if we further restrict the number of tolerated server failures?
1.2. Contributions. We show in this paper that, interestingly, the existence of a fast SWMR implementation depends on the maximum number R of readers. Notice here the focus on SWMR implementations; in this paper we, therefore, assume R ≥ 2. We consider a general model of computation where t among the set S of server processes on which the data structure is implemented can fail; in this paper, we assume t ≥ 1. A server can fail by crashing, or even by deviating arbitrarily from its algorithm and be malicious (also called Byzantine [26] ). We denote by b the number of arbitrary server failures, where 0 ≤ b ≤ t. In this paper, we consider the authenticated arbitrary failure model in which processes can rely on unforgeable digital signatures [28] .
The main contribution of this paper is a theorem stating the following:
. There is a fast implementation of a SWMR register if and only if the number of readers R is less than
S+b t+b − 2. The paper proves this theorem by giving a fast implementation and then proving it optimal (in terms of number of readers). Both the algorithm and the lower bound proof are, we believe, interesting in their own rights. The algorithm uses a new trace-based memory access technique whereas the lower bound uses a sieve-based run construction scheme.
• Algorithm. Our fast implementation relies on the idea of traces left by readers in the servers they access, even if they expedite their operation in one round-trip. These traces are then used to determine which value to return while preserving atomicity. It is important to notice at this point that this idea has not been used in the register transformations literature e.g., [4] because, in a read/write shared memory, a process cannot read a value and at the same time leave a trace. We exploit the idea to obtain a crash-stop fast implementation (i.e., assuming b = 0 and R < S t − 2) and then a Byzantineresilient one (i.e., assuming b = 0).
To get an intuition of the idea in the crash-stop case, consider the classical algorithm of [4] , sketched above, and the following observation: if a reader sees the latest timestamp ts at x servers, then any subsequent reader sees ts or a higher timestamp at x − t servers; this is because, in a fast implementation, the first reader does not propagate ts, and the second reader might miss t servers seen by the first reader. A generalization of this observation helps determine when some reader can safely return the value associated with the latest timestamp. This is not entirely trivial because the atomicity of a value cannot be simply deduced from the number of servers that has seen the value. To determine whether a value is safe to return, we make every server maintain, besides the latest value, the set of readers to which the server has sent that value. This is the actual trace left by the readers.
• Lower bound. Consider S server processes, t among which can be faulty, and none is Byzantine. We prove by contradiction that there is no fast implementation with R ≥ S t − 2 (recall here that we assume R ≥ 2 and t ≥ 1). We illustrate the proof in Figure 1 .1 for S = 4, t = 1 and R = 2. Given a fast implementation with R ≥ S t − 2, we consider a partial run which contains a write(1) that misses t servers, to which we append a read that misses t other servers (see Fig. 1.1(a) ). Then we delete all the steps in the partial run that are not "visible" to the reader (basically, the steps of the t servers that the read missed). By atomicity, the read returns 1 in the resulting partial run. Now we iteratively append reads, each acting like a sieve, by distinct readers, and delete the steps in the partial run that are not visible to the last reader, until we exhaust all the readers ( Fig. 1.1(b) ). To ensure atomicity, the last read of each partial run returns 1. In the final partial run (obtained after exhausting all readers) the steps of write(1) are almost deleted. We modify this partial run to construct several additional partial runs, one of which violates atomicity. In the special case shown in Figure 1 .1(c)) we obtain atomicity violation by reusing the first reader r 1 : a) the first read invocation by r 1 , concurrent with that of reader r 2 , cannot return 1 because it cannot read value 1 from any server (the response from s 3 is never received since s 3 crashes) and b) for similar reasons, the following read by r 1 cannot return 1, however a preceding read by r 2 already returned 1 -an atomicity violation. The lower bound proof is then extended to the case where b ≤ t servers can fail in an arbitrary manner: we show that a fast implementation is possible only if the number of readers is less than S+b t+b − 2. Finally, to complete the picture, we prove that it is impossible to have a one-round read algorithm with multiple writers [20] (MWMR atomic register) even if only one server can fail and it can only do so by crashing.
1.3. Roadmap. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the system model. Section 3 defines atomic (and fast) register implementations. We present a fast implementation assuming R < S t − 2 in Section 4. We prove a tight bound for R in Section 5. Section 6 extends the previous results to the arbitrary failure model. Section 7 considers the multi-writer case. We discuss related work in Section 8. Section 9 summarizes the main results of the paper.
2. System Model.
2.1. Basics. The distributed system we consider consists of three disjoint sets of processes: a set servers (also denoted by Σ) of cardinality S containing processes {s 1 , ..., s S }, a set writer containing a single process {w} (we discuss the multi-writer case in Section 7), and a set readers of cardinality R containing processes {r 1 , ..., r R }. We refer to the elements from writer ∪ readers as clients. We also denote a set Σ \ Σ , where Σ ⊆ Σ by Σ . Every pair of processes communicate by message-passing using a bi-directional reliable communication channel. Notice that the reliable channels assumption is needed to ensure wait-freedom, but not atomicity (we define these notions later). We also assume the existence of a global clock; however, processes cannot access the global clock.
A distributed algorithm A is a collection of automata, where A p is the automata assigned to process p [22] . Computation proceeds in steps of A. A run is an infinite sequence of steps of A. A partial run is a finite prefix of some run. A (partial) run r extends some partial run pr if pr is a prefix of r. At the end of a partial run, all messages that are sent but not yet received are said to be in transit. In any given run, any number of readers, the writer, and t out of S servers may crash. We extend our failure model to allow for arbitrary failures in Section 6.
Details of the System
Model. The state of communication channels is viewed as a set of messages mset containing messages that are sent but not yet received. We assume that every message has two tags which identify the sender and the receiver of the message. A distributed algorithm A is a collection of automata, where A p is the automata assigned to process p. Computation proceeds in steps of A. A step of A is denoted by a pair of process id and message set < p, M > (M might be ∅). In step < p, M >, process p atomically does the following: (1) remove the messages in M from mset, (2) apply M and its current state st p to A p , which outputs a new state st p and a set of messages to be sent, and then (3) p adopts st p as its new state and puts the output messages in mset.
Given any algorithm A, a run of A is an infinite sequence of steps of A such that the following properties hold for each process p: (1) initially, mset = ∅, (2) the current state in the first step of p is a special state Init, (3) for each step < p, M >, and for every message m ∈ M , p is the receiver of m and mset contains m immediately before the step < p, M > is taken, and (4) (reliable channels) if there is a step that puts a message m in mset such that p is the receiver of m and both p and the sender of m take an infinite number of steps, then there is a step < p, M > such that m ∈ M .
A partial run is a finite prefix of some run. We say that a process is correct in a run if it takes an infinite number of steps in that run. Otherwise the process is faulty. In a run of our model, any number of readers or the writer may be faulty, and at most t ≤ S servers might be faulty. We say that a (faulty) process p crashes at step sp in a run, if sp is the last step of p in that run. Notice that the assumption of reliable channels does not guarantee that correct processes always receive messages sent by faulty processes.
For presentation simplicity, we do not explicitly model the initial state of a process, nor the invocations and responses of operations. We assume that the algorithm A initializes the processes, and schedules invocation/response of operations (i.e., A modifies the states of the processes accordingly). However, we say that p invokes an operation op at step sp, if A modifies the state of a process p in step sp so as to invoke an operation (and similarly for response).
In any run, we say that an operation op1 precedes operation op2 (or op2 follows op1) if the response step of op1 precedes the invocation step of op2 in that run. If neither op1 nor op2 precedes the other, the operations are said to be concurrent. We say that an operation is complete in a (partial) run if the run contains a response step for that operation. We assume that all (partial) runs are well-formed, i.e., no process p invokes a new operation before all operations previously invoked by p have completed.
A history of a partial run is a sequence of invocation and response steps of operations in the same order as they appear in the partial run. An incomplete operation in a history H is an operation whose invocation step is in H, but the matching response step is not in H. We say that a history H1 completes history H2 if H1 can be obtained through the following modification of H2: for each incomplete operation op in H2, either invocation step of op is removed from H2, or any valid matching response for that invocation is appended to the end of H2.
Atomic Register.
A sequential register is a data structure accessed by multiple processes in a non-concurrent manner (i.e., no two operations on a sequential register are concurrent). It provides two operations: write(v), which stores v in the register, and read(), which returns the last value stored. Only readers invoke reads on the register and only the writer invokes writes on the register. We further assume that there is a special write wr 0 operation that initializes the register by writing a special value ⊥ (which is not a valid input value for other writes) such that wr 0 precedes all other operations.
An atomic register is a distributed data structure that may be concurrently accessed by multiple processes and yet provides an "illusion" of a sequential register to the accessing processes. An algorithm implements an atomic register if every run of the algorithm satisfies termination and atomicity properties, defined in the following.
3.1. Definition. Termination states that if a correct process invokes an operation, then eventually the operation completes (even if all other client processes have crashed).
A run satisfies atomicity, if for every history H of any of its partial runs, there is a history H that completes H and H satisfies the properties A1-A3 below (Lemma 13.16 of [21] ). Let Π be the set of all operations in H. There is an irreflexive partial ordering ≺ of all the operations in H such that: (A1) if op1 precedes op2 in H then it is not the case that op2 ≺ op1, (A2) if op1 is a write operation in Π and op2 is any other operation in Π, then either op1 ≺ op2 or op2 ≺ op1 in Π, and (A3) the value returned by each read operation is the value written by the last preceding write operation according to ≺.
In our single writer setting assuming well-formed runs, atomicity properties A1-A3 can be simplified. Namely, in the single-writer case, the relation precedes totally orders write operations (and, likewise, the values stored by these). Before we give the equivalent definition of atomicity in the single writer setting, we introduce some additional notation.
In a given run, we denote by wr k the write that is preceded by exactly k writes (including the initial write wr 0 ). In other words, for k ≥ 1, wr k denotes the k th write by the writer in a given run (note that wr 0 is not invoked by the writer). Then, we say that an operation op returns a timestamp k, if: a) op is wr k , or b) op is a read that returns the value stored by wr k .
Consider a relation ≺ such that op 1 Indeed, it is straightforward to see that Property A1 of ≺ is implied by Properties SWA2 and SWA4, whereas property A3 is implied by properties SWA1, SWA2 and SWA3. Finally, Property A2 follows immediately from our definition of ≺, the ordering of write operations (well-formedness) and SWA1. Hence, to show that a single writer register implementation satisfies atomicity, it is sufficient to show that it satisfies the properties SWA1-SWA4.
Time-Complexity of Implementations.
We define the time-complexity of atomic register implementation in terms of communication round-trips. An operation op invoked by client c consists of a sequence of round-trips, where a round-trip contains the following three phases.
1. Client c sends messages to a subset of processes in a step. (In the first roundtrip of the operation, the invocation step of operation precedes this send step.) 2. Upon receiving a message m in step sp1 =< p, M > (m ∈ M ), where m is sent by the client c in phase 1 of the round-trip, a process p replies to c either in step sp1 itself, or in a subsequent step sp2, such that p does not receive any message in any step between sp1 and sp2, including sp2. (In other words, upon receiving m, p replies to the client before receiving any other messages. Intuitively, this requirement forbids the processes to wait for some other message before replying to m.) 3. Upon receiving a sufficient number of above replies, client c either returns from op or moves to the next round-trip. We would like to note the following points to emphasize the generality of the above definition: (1) steps from phase 2 and phase 3 of a round-trip may interleave, (2) round-trips of different operations (by different clients) may overlap, and (3) there is no requirement on the communications between a pair of processes both of which are distinct from the client (e.g., the servers may communicate among themselves using any message exchange pattern). Also, note that the above definition is close to the time-complexity definition in [13] , where a round-trip in the above definition corresponds to a round in [13] .
Fast Implementations.
A read or a write operation is fast if it completes in one communication round-trip. We say that an atomic register implementation is fast if both its read and write operations are fast.
Recall that implementations need to tolerate the crash of any client and up to t servers. Hence, in order to ensure termination in a fast implementation, a reader (or a writer) cannot wait for replies from any other client, or more than S − t servers, in the first round-trip of the operation. For an implementation that has fast reads, we can say without ambiguity that the messages sent by a reader, on invoking a read, are of type read, and the reply sent by a process to the reader, on receiving a read message, are of type readack. Similarly, we define write and writeack messages for fast writes.
We would like to note that no register implementation can have all its write invocations return in the first round-trip before receiving any writeack message. Suppose by contradiction that a write(v) by writer w returns in the first round-trip before receiving any writeack message. Then, w cannot distinguish this operation from another incomplete operation where all write messages of the operation are in transit. In the latter operation, suppose the operation returns before any write message is received, w crashes, and no write messages are ever received. Then, no subsequent read can recover and return v. Thus, in terms of worst-case timecomplexity, it is not possible to improve over fast implementations.
4.
A Fast Atomic Register Implementation. In the following, we first describe our fast implementation assuming R < S t − 2 and then prove its correctness. For simplicity of presentation, we first present our algorithm assuming that the writer writes timestamps, and the readers read back timestamps. Later we explain how to simply generalize our algorithm such that the writer and the readers associate some value with a timestamp.
4.1. Algorithm. The pseudocode of our fast implementation is given in Figure 4.1. The write procedure is similar to that of [4] . On invoking a write, the writer increments its timestamp (initialized to 0) and sends a write message with the timestamp to all servers (lines 4-5). Upon receiving the message, servers update the timestamp and send writeack messages back to the writer (lines [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] . The writer returns ok once it has received writeack messages from S − t servers (lines 6-7).
Implementing a fast read is more involved. Like several previous atomic register implementations, our read procedure collects timestamps from S−t servers (by sending read messages and receiving readack messages from the servers), and selects the highest timestamp, denoted by maxT S in line 15, Figure 4 .1. However, notice that in our fast implementation server s i , besides storing the highest received timestamp in its local variable ts i , maintains also the set updated i that contains all clients to which s i has sent the current value of ts i . Basically, updated i contains all clients to which s i has sent an update (in the form of a readack or a writeack message) about its highest timestamp. This information is read in our read procedure along with the timestamps. Hence, a reader collects timestamps and sets updated * from S − t servers using read and readack messages (lines 12-13 and 32).
Upon receiving S − t readack messages (collected in the set rcvM sg, line 14), the read is precluded from waiting for more messages (the remaining t servers may be faulty). Moreover, in order to have a fast implementation, the read may only perform some local computations and then it must return the value. In our fast implementation, the essence of this local computation is captured by predicate admissible (line 8) 0: at the writer w: 1: procedure initialization:
ts ← 0 3: procedure write() 4: ts ← ts + 1 5: send(write, ts) to all servers 6: wait until receive(writeack, ts) from S − t servers 7: return(ok) at each reader r i :
9: procedure initialization:
maxT S ← 0 11: procedure read()
12:
send(read, maxT S) to all servers 13: wait until receive(readack, * , * ) from S − t servers 14: rcvM sg ← {m|r i received (readack, * , * ) in line 13}
15:
maxT S ← Max{ts| (readack, ts, * ) ∈ rcvM sg} 16 :
return(maxT S) which relies on the sets updated * to evaluate whether the highest received timestamp maxT S may be returned. Namely, if there is an integer a (1 ≤ a ≤ R + 1), such that admissible(maxT S, rcvM sg, a) holds in line 16 (we simply say that maxT S is admissible (with degree a)), the read returns maxT S (line 17). Otherwise, if maxT S is not admissible, a read returns maxT S − 1. In any case, maxT S is cached locally, and is written back by the reader in its following invocation of read (line 12).
In the following, we give an intuition behind the predicate admissible() which is the heart of our fast implementation. The predicate is designed to guarantee that:
(a) maxT S = k is admissible in read rd whenever wr k precedes rd -this is vital for ensuring "read-write" atomicity, captured by Property SWA2, Section 3.1, and (b) if maxT S = k is admissible in read rd, then no rd that follows rd returns a timestamp smaller than k -this is vital for ensuring "read-read" atomicity, captured by Property SWA4, Section 3.1.
First, we explain how our predicate guarantees (a). Consider the following partial run, pr 1 . In pr 1 , write wr k (k ≥ 1) completes by writing k to all servers from some set Σ 1 containing S − t servers. There are no writes in pr 1 that follow wr k . Moreover, read rd (by some reader r i ), that follows wr k , reads from set Σ 2 of S − t servers that intersects in S − 2t servers with Σ 1 , i.e., rd misses t servers in Σ 1 . By atomicity, rd must return k in pr 1 , and it must do so without waiting for messages from servers from Σ 2 or the writer, since these may be faulty. In this case: (i) in line 15 of rd, maxT S = k, and (ii) for every message m received by r i in rd from servers from
On the other hand, the key to guaranteeing (b) is the following invariant (hereafter, maxT S op denotes maxT S computed in line 15 of the read operation op): Lemma 1. Let rd be a complete read (by reader r j ) that follows a complete read rd (by r i ). If maxT S rd is admissible with degree a rd ≤ R + 1, then:
• maxT S rd = maxT S rd and maxT S rd is admissible with degree a rd + 1 or degree 1 in rd . Here, we sketch the proof of Lemma 1 (the full correctness proof of our implementation can be found in Section 4.2), and illustrate it in Figure 4. 
2.
Proof. By the definition of the predicate admissible (line 8), there is a set of readack messages µ rd , sent by servers from the set Σ rd to reader r i , such that, for every message m in µ rd , m.ts = maxT S rd , |Σ rd | = |µ rd | ≥ S − a rd t and |Π rd | ≥ a rd , where Π rd = m∈µ rd m.updated. Notice that, since a rd ≤ R + 1 and R < S t − 2, we have |Σ rd | ≥ t + 1. Moreover, since (a) rd follows rd, (b) |Σ rd | ≥ t + 1 and (c) rd reads from S − t servers, rd receives a readack from at least 1 server from Σ rd . Hence, maxT S rd ≥ maxT S rd .
If maxT S rd = maxT S rd = k, we distinguish two cases:
∈ Π rd (note that this case is possible only if a rd ≤ R). It is not difficult to see that k is admissible in rd with degree a rd + 1. Indeed, rd will miss at most t servers from Σ rd , receiving at least S − (a rd + 1)t readack messages containing the timestamp k, and the updated * fields of these messages will be a su-
Since read rd is guaranteed to readack messages from at least 2 servers in {s 1 , s 2 , s 6 } and these servers add r j in their updated sets, maxT S rd = 2 is admissible with degree 4
Hence, all servers from {s 1 , s 2 , s 6 } send a readack message with ts = 2 to r j before rd is invoked and maxT S rd = 2 in some read rd by r j that precedes rd . Hence, in rd , r j sends read message with ts = 2 and maxT S rd = 2 is admissible with degree 1 perset of Π rd ∪ {r j }, hence each containing at least a rd + 1 clients.
, r j ∈ Π rd (which indicates that rd is not the first read by r j ). In this case, all servers from Σ rd , at least t + 1 of them, have sent a readack message to r j containing the timestamp k before rd is invoked. At least one of those must have been received by r j in read rd that immediately precedes rd . Hence, maxT S rd = k, and maxT S in line 12 of rd equals k. Finally, S − t servers send readack to rd with the timestamp equal to k and the set updated that contains {r j } (see lines [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] , i.e., k is admissible with degree 1 in rd . Finally, to help distinguish read and readack messages from different reads of the same reader, we implicitly (for better readability of pseudocode) assume that every reader r j maintains a local variable rdCnt j that r j increments at the beginning of every read invocation. Reader r j includes rdCnt j in each read message (line 12) and servers reply including rdCnt j in a readack message (line 32). Servers cache the highest seen rdCnt j for every reader r j ; namely, before sending a readack message to r j , a server stores locally rdCnt j and does not reply to read messages from r j that contain rdCnt j < rdCnt j . Hence, once server s i replies to read rd invoked by reader r j , s i replies only to those reads of r j that follow rd. To refer to this invariant, we say that servers ignore old reads.
This completes the brief description of the register implementation. We now describe how to modify the algorithm so as to associate values with timestamps. In the modified algorithm, in each write, the writer attaches two tags with the timestamp, containing the current value to be written and the value of the immediately preceding write. If the reader returns maxT S in the original algorithm, then it returns the current value attached to maxT S in the modified algorithm. If the reader returns maxT S − 1 in the original algorithm, it returns the other tag attached to maxT S in the modified algorithm.
Correctness of the Fast Implementation.
It is obvious that the read/write time-complexity is one communication round-trip. To show atomicity, we need to prove Properties SWA1-SWA4 of Section 3.1. In the proof, we use the following notation:
Definition 4.1. Proof. To prove the lemma, it is sufficient to show that there is no read rd in which maxT S old rd < 0 (then, the lemma follows from Lemma 4.4). To see this, assume by contradiction that there is a read rd by reader r i in which maxT S old rd < 0. By lines 9-10, this is not the first read by r i , i.e., there is a read rd by r i that (immediately) precedes r i such that maxT S rd < 0, i.e., S − t servers sent readack message in rd with ts * < 0. However, since server timestamps are initialized to 0, this contradicts Lemma 4.2.
rcvM sg

Lemma 4.6. "read-write" atomicity (SWA2). If a read rd returns timestamp l and rd follows write wr
Proof. Denote by r i the reader that invoked rd and let Σ = Σ wr k ∩ Σ rd . Since
When a server s j in Σ wr k (and, hence, in Σ ) replies to a write message from wr k , its ts j is at least k (server timestamp is not smaller than k due to the condition in line 23 Proof. We focus on the case k ≥ 1, since the proof for k = 0 follows from the definition of wr 0 . To prove the lemma, it is sufficient to show that no server sets its local timestamp to a value greater or equal to k, before wr k is invoked. Assume, by contradiction, that there is such server s i that is, moreover, the first server to set its local timestamp ts i to l ≥ k according to the global clock (at time T ), i.e., no server sets its local timestamp to l before time T .
It is obvious that wr k and wr l (which might be the same operations) are invoked after T . Hence, s i must have set ts i to l after receiving a read message in a read rd invoked by reader r j in which maxT S old rd = l. Since l ≥ k ≥ 1, there is a read rd by r j that immediately precedes rd in which maxT S rd = l. Since rd precedes rd , rd completes before time T . By definition of maxT S rd , some server had set its local timestamp to l before rd completed. A contradiction with the assumption that no server sets its local timestamp before time T .
Lemma 4.7 has the following important corollary. 
Lemma 4.11. Assume that maxT S rd is admissible with degree a ∈ [1, R + 1] in some read rd and that a complete read rd follows rd. Then, the number of servers in
The following Lemma proves the key invariant used in the proof of Property SWA4 of Section 3.1. Proof. Since the messages in µ rd,a are sent before the completion of rd (and hence, before the invocation of rd ) and since, there is a server s i that sends m i ∈ µ rd,a with r j ∈ m i .updated, r j has invoked at least one read before rd . Let rd be the last read by reader r j which precedes rd . Since |X| ≥ t + 1 and Proof. Without loss of generality we can assume (to facilitate the notation) that read rd 1 (resp., rd 2 ) is invoked by reader r 1 (resp., r 2 ). Suppose r 1 = r 2 . Then, in the read that immediately follows rd 1 , r 1 sends a read message with ts ≥ ret rd1 , and hence, by Lemma 4.4, the read returns a value greater than or equal to ret rd1 . Using Lemma 4.4 and a simple induction, we can derive that any read by r 1 which follows rd 1 (including rd 2 ) returns ts ≥ ret rd 1 . Therefore, in the rest of the proof we assume that r 1 = r 2 . We distinguish the following two cases:
1. 
However, if R > S − 2 then the above partitioning is not possible. In that case we consider a system where the number of readers is S − 2 and the set readers is {r 1 , ..., r S−2 }, and show the impossibility. The impossibility still holds if we add more readers to this system (i.e., R > S − 2). Notice that our model does not require that a message sent by a faulty process is received by the receiver. Hence, in any (partial) run, it is possible any message sent by a faulty process remains in transit (i.e., that such a message is never received by the receiver). In our proof we construct (partial) runs in which, unless explicitly stated otherwise, all messages sent by faulty processes are in transit.
We say that an incomplete operation op skips a set of blocks BS in a partial run, where BS ⊆ {B 1 , ..., B R+2 }, if (1) no server in any block B i ∈ BS receives any read or write message from op in that partial run, (2) all other servers receive the read or the write message from op and reply to that message, and (3) all these reply messages are in transit. We say that a complete operation op skips a block B i in a partial run, if (1) no server in B i receives any read or write message from op in that partial run, (2) all servers that are not in B i receive the read or write message from op and reply to that message and (3) the invoking process receives all these reply messages and returns from the invocation.
Block diagrams. To depict our proof, we use block diagrams (see Fig. 5.1 ). We depict an operation op through a set of rectangles, (generally) arranged in a single column. In the column corresponding to some operation op, we draw a rectangle in the i th row, if all servers in block B i have received the read or write message from op and have sent reply messages, i.e., we draw a rectangle in the i th row if op does not skip B i .
We illustrate a particular instance of the proof in Figure 5 .2 and Figure 5 .3, where R = 3 and the set of servers are partitioned into five blocks, B 1 to B 5 .
We now proceed to the proof of Proposition 5.1. Proof. To show a contradiction, we construct a partial run of the fast implementation I that violates atomicity: a partial run in which some read returns 1 and a subsequent read returns an older value, namely, the initial value of the register, ⊥.
Partial writes. Consider a partial run wr in which w completes write(1) on the register. The operation skips B R+2 . We define a series of partial runs each of which can be extended to wr. Let wr R+2 be the partial run in which w has invoked the write and has sent the write message to all processes, and all write messages are in transit. For 1 ≤ i ≤ R + 1, we define wr i as the partial run which contains an incomplete write(1) that skips {B R+2 } ∪ {B j |1 ≤ j ≤ i − 1}. We make the following simple observations: (1) for 1 ≤ i ≤ R, wr i and wr i+1 differ only at servers in B i , (2) wr is an extension of wr 1 , such that, in wr, w receives the replies (that are in transit in wr 1 ) and the write completes, and hence, (3) wr and wr 1 differ only at w. A sample partial writes, wr 1 and wr 3 are presented in Figure 5 .1.
Appending reads. Partial run pr 1 extends wr by appending a complete read by r 1 that skips block B 1 . By atomicity, the read returns 1. Observe that r 1 cannot distinguish pr 1 from some partial run pr 1 , that extends wr 2 by appending a complete read by r 1 that skips B 1 . To see why, notice that wr and wr 2 differ at w and at block B 1 , and r 1 does not receive any message from these processes in both runs. Thus r 1 's read returns 1 in pr 1 .
Starting from pr 1 , we iteratively define the following partial runs for 2 ≤ i ≤ R. Partial run pr i extends pr i−1 by appending a complete read by r i that skips B i . Partial run pr i is constructed by deleting from pr i , all steps of the servers in block B i . Since the last read in pr i by reader r i skips block B i , r i cannot distinguish pr i from pr i . More precisely, partial run pr i extends wr i+1 by appending the following i reads one after the other: for 1 ≤ h ≤ i, r h does a read that skips {B j |h ≤ j ≤ i}. Here, the first i − 1 appended reads are incomplete whereas the last one is complete. Figure 5 .2 depicts block diagrams of pr i and pr i with R = 3. (The deletion of steps to obtain pr i from pr i is shown by crossing out the rectangles corresponding to the deleted steps.) Reader r 1 's read in pr 1 returns 1. Since pr 2 extends pr 1 , by atomicity, r 2 's read in pr 2 returns 1. However, as r 2 cannot distinguish pr 2 from pr 2 , r 2 's read in pr 2 returns 1. In general, since pr i extends pr i−1 , and r i cannot distinguish pr i from pr i (for all i such that 2 ≤ i ≤ R), it follows from a trivial induction that r i 's read in pr i returns 1. In particular, r R reads 1 in pr R .
Partial run pr
A . Consider the partial run pr R : wr R+1 extended by appending R reads by each reader r h (1 ≤ h ≤ R) such that r h 's read skips {B j |h ≤ j ≤ R}. The read by r 1 is incomplete in pr R : only servers in B R+1 and B R+2 send replies to r 1 , and those reply messages are in transit. Observe that, in pr R , only the servers in B R+1 receive the write message from the write (1) (1) is not invoked at all, and hence, servers in B R+1 do not receive any write message ( Figure 5.3) . Clearly, only servers in B R+1 , the writer, and the readers r 2 to r R can distinguish pr A from pr B . Reader r 1 cannot distinguish the two partial runs because it does not receive any message from the servers in B R+1 , the writer, or other readers. By atomicity, r 1 's read returns (the initial value of the register) ⊥ in pr B because there is no write( * ) invocation in pr B , and hence, r 1 's read returns ⊥ in pr A as well. 6. Arbitrary Failure Model. In this section we consider fast implementations that tolerate arbitrary failures of servers and readers, but the writer can fail only by crashing (intuitively, in our single-writer setting, arbitrarily faulty writer could make the shared data structure useless). An arbitrary failure can either correspond to a crash or a malicious behavior. A process is malicious if it deviates from the algorithm assigned to it in a way that is different from simply stopping all activities (crashing). We allow for any number of arbitrarily faulty readers and distinguish two resilience thresholds for server failures: b and t [19] . Just as in the crash-stop model, a maximum number of t servers can fail. However, out of these t servers, at most b can be malicious. We therefore always have b ≤ t. In the literature, the special case where b = t is usually considered. However, by considering b and t separately we can directly generalize the results in the previous sections (i.e. with b = 0).
Partial runs pr
In our arbitrary failure model, malicious processes an deviate arbitrarily from automata assigned to them, with the restriction with respect to creation of digital signatures of other processes as detailed below. In the remainder of this Section, we say that a process is faulty if it fails by crashing or if it is malicious (otherwise, a process is called correct). We also say that a process is non-malicious if it is correct or fails by crashing.
In this paper, we assume that a process can produce cryptographic digital signatures (e.g., [28] ). The functionality of the digital signature scheme provides two operations: σ for signing and V er for signature verification. The invocation of σ takes a process ID, say p and a bit string m as parameters and returns a bit string sig, called signature. The verification operation V er takes a process ID p, and two bit strings m and sig as parameters and returns a boolean. The verification function has the property that V er(p, m, sig) invoked by a benign process evaluates to true if and only if process p executed σ(p, m) in some previous step. Furthermore, no process (including Byzantine ones) other than p may invoke σ(p, m) (we say signatures are unforgeable); hence, alternatively, we also write σ(p, m) as σ p (m).
Finally, given that we allow for arbitrarily faulty readers, we require atomicity to hold in a given run only on the subset of non-malicious read/write operations invoked by non-malicious clients (i.e., when read invocations/responses at malicious readers are removed from a run). For simplicity of presentation, we refer to an operation invoked by a non-malicious client as to a non-malicious operation.
6.1. A Fast Implementation. We describe in this section a fast implementation in the arbitrary failure model assuming S > (R+2)t+(R+1)b which is equivalent to R < S+b t+b −2 (Figure 6.1) . The algorithm is similar to the one presented in Section 4 except for a few key differences. First of all, the writer digitally signs each value it sends to servers. Apart from the addition of digital signatures, the write mechanism is unchanged and the writer waits for the response of S − t servers. Server code related 0: at the writer w: 1: procedure initialization: 2: ts ← 0 3: procedure write() 4: ts ← ts + 1 5: send (write, ts, σ w (ts)) to all servers 6: wait until receive (writeack, ts) from S − t servers 7: return(ok) at each reader r i :
maxT S ← 0; sig ← ⊥ 11: procedure read() 12: send(read, maxT S, sig) to all servers 13: wait until receive (readack, ts , sig , updated ) from S − t servers, such that:
ts ≥ maxT S and r i ∈ updated and V er(w, ts , sig )
14:
rcvM sg ← {m|r i received (readack, * , * , * ) in line 13 }
15:
maxT S ← Max{ts| (readack, ts, * , * ) ∈ rcvM sg} 16: sig ← sig maxT S : (readack, maxT S, sig maxT S , * ) ∈ rcvM sg 17: if there is a ∈ [1, R to write operation is also unchanged, except that servers store the digital signature of every value they store in addition to the value itself.
Our read procedure begins with servers issuing a read message containing the highest timestamp encountered in the previous read invocation (line 12) along with the respective signature of the writer. In a way, the reader writes back this timestamp, signed by the writer, to all servers. During the first read invocation, the reader issues a read message with the default timestamp 0, which is also the initial timestamp at servers and writer. We assume that this initial value is known to all readers (and hence, needs not be digitally signed by the writer). Then, the reader collects responses from S − t servers containing the latest timestamps encountered by the servers (including the one being written back by the reader); all the timestamps need to be accompanied with the verifiable signature of the writer (line 13). The reader then selects the highest such timestamp, maxT S (line 15). Moreover, the reader stores the corresponding writer's signature into variable sig (line 16). The pair (maxT S, sig) will be written back by the reader in its next read invocation (lines 12, 23-27 and 31-33).
Apart from using digital signatures as described above, the mechanism of the read procedure is very similar to our crash-tolerant algorithm of Figure 4 .1 (Sec. 4.1). The additional difference is related to predicate admissible in line 8, which checks if the latest value has been seen by a sufficient number of servers, and which is slightly modified. Namely, in order for maxT S (i.e., the highest timestamp received in a read) to be admissible with degree a, maxT S must have been reported to the reader by at least S − at − (a − 1)b servers. This is to be contrasted with at least S − at reports needed in the crash-only case (notice here that the number of servers S is not identical in the crash-only and the arbitrary failure cases, being higher in the latter). To see why our algorithm requires S − at − (a − 1)b confirmations from different servers, consider the case of a write with timestamp ts that is followed by a read. In the first partial run pr 1 , the write completes by writing ts at S − t servers, out of which at least S − t − b are non-malicious; denote this set of servers by S 1 . Subsequently, a reader reads from a set S 2 (of S − t servers) that overlaps in S − 2t − b (non-malicious) servers with S 1 , i.e., the reader misses t servers in S 1 . By atomicity, the read returns ts. In the second partial run pr 2 , with a failure pattern different from pr 1 , the write is incomplete and the writer writes ts only to S − 2t − b servers (possibly malicious) in S 1 ∩ S 2 . A subsequent reader that reads from S 2 cannot distinguish pr 1 from pr 2 , and returns ts. If we extend each partial run with another read by a distinct reader that misses t servers from S 1 ∩ S 2 , and accounting for the possibility that another b servers are malicious, it is easy to see that the new read has to return ts, even if it sees ts at S − 3t − 2b servers that have already replied to both the write and the first read. This can be extrapolated further depending on the number of the readers in the system. Hence the need for as few as S − at − (a − 1)b different confirmations for a timestamp to be admissible (with degree a).
We now prove the correctness of the fast implementation depicted in Figure 6 .1.
Correctness of the Fast Implementation.
The skeleton of the proof follows the proof of our crash-tolerant algorithm (Sec. 4.2); differences in two proofs account for counteracting possible actions of malicious processes, the use of digital signatures and modifications of predicate admissible. In the following, we omit correctness proofs of those lemmas that can be trivially obtained from the proof of their counterparts from Section 4.2, by inserting the attribute "non-malicious" before every occurrence of "server", "reader" and "read" and by replacing every reference to Lemma/Corollary 4.x, by Lemma/Corollary 6.x. However, for completeness, we repeat the statement of each of the lemmas in the arbitrary failure context. In our proof, we maintain the assumption that non-malicious servers ignore old reads as explained in Sec. 4.1.
First we modify some notation of the Definition 4.1 as follows (other notation from Def. 4.1 remains): Definition 6.1.
• µ op,a denotes, in case maxT S op is admissible with degree a in op, the subset of rcvM sg op , such that (see line 8, Fig. 6.1) : Proof. By line 24, every readack message received by a non-malicious reader in rd from a non-malicious server is with a timestamp at least maxT S old rd . The reader awaits for S−t readack messages before returning a value. Moreover, reader discards all readack messages that have a timestamp less than maxT S old rd (line 13), as those readack messages are clearly from malicious servers. Eventually, since we assume at most t server failures, rd receives readack messages from S − t non-malicious servers that satisfy conditions in line 13. Clearly, maxT S rd ≥ maxT S Proof. To prove the lemma, it is sufficient to show that there is no non-malicious read rd in which maxT S old rd < 0 (then, the lemma follows from Lemma 4.4). To see this, assume by contradiction that there is a read rd by non-malicious reader r i in which maxT S old rd < 0. Moreover, without loss of generality, we can fix rd such that there is no read rd by r i such that rd precedes rd and maxT S old rd < 0. By lines 9-10, this rd is not the first read by r i , i.e., there is a read rd by r i that (immediately) precedes r i such that maxT S rd < 0 and maxT S old rd ≥ 0. However, this contradicts the condition in line 13 that requires maxT S rd ≥ maxT S old rd . Lemma 6.6. "read-write" atomicity (SWA2). If a non-malicious read rd returns timestamp l and rd follows write wr k , then l ≥ k.
Proof. Denote by r i the non-malicious reader that invoked rd and let Σ = Σ wr k ∩ Σ rd and let Σ N M be the subset of Σ that contains only non-malicious (NM) servers. Obviously,
When a non-malicious server s j in Σ wr k (and, hence, in Σ N M ) replies to a write message from wr k , its ts j is at least k (the timestamp is not smaller than k due to the condition in line 24). Since wr k precedes rd, by Lemma 6.2, servers in Σ reply with ts * ≥ k to rd. Hence, maxT S rd ≥ k. There are the following two cases to consider:
1. maxT S rd > k By Lemma 6.3, rd does not return a timestamp lower than k. Proof. In case k = 0, the lemma follows directly from the definition of wr 0 . In case k ≥ 1, the proof follows directly from the unforgeability of writer's signatures and the fact that the writer does not sign any value greater or equal to k before it invokes wr k . Hence, no timestamp k ≥ k can pass the signature verification check in line 13 before wr k is invoked. 
maxT S
Since we assume at most b malicious servers, Σ µ rd,a contains at least t+1 non-malicious servers.
Lemma 6.11. Assume that maxT S rd is admissible with degree a ∈ [1, R + 1] in some non-malicious read rd and that a complete non-malicious read rd follows rd. Then, the number of non-malicious servers in Σ µ rd,a ∩Σ rd is at least S −(a+1)t−ab. Moreover, Σ µ rd,a ∩ Σ rd contains at least one non-malicious server.
Proof. Theorem 6.14. The algorithm of Figure 6 .1 is a fast implementation of an atomic SWMR register in the arbitrary failure model.
Proof. Atomicity follows from Lemmas 6.5, 6.6, 6.9 and 6.13. Moreover, it is obvious that our implementation satisfies Termination -conditions in lines 6 and 13 are non-blocking since we assume at least S-t correct (and non-malicious) servers. Finally, our implementation is fast: all operations involve a single communication round-trip between a client and servers. This proof is similar to the one in Section 5: we suppose by contradiction that (R + 2)t + (R + 1)b ≥ S and that there is a fast implementation I of an atomic register (even if I makes use of digital signatures). We construct a partial run of the fast implementation I that violates atomicity: a partial run in which some read returns 1 and a subsequent read returns an older value, namely, the initial value of the register, ⊥. This run is different from the one in the previous proof.
Proof. Given that (R + 2)t + (R + 1)b ≥ S, we can partition the set of servers into 2R + 3 subsets, which we call blocks, denoted by T i (1 ≤ i ≤ R + 2) and B j (1 ≤ j ≤ R + 1), such that each of the blocks T i (resp., B j ) is of size less than or equal to t (resp., b). We illustrate a particular instance of the proof in Figure 6 .2 and Figure 6 .3, where R = 3 and the set of servers are partitioned into nine blocks, T 1 to T 5 and B 1 to B 4 . In these figures, we denote the arbitrary failure of B i by @.
Partial writes. Consider a partial run wr in which w completes write(1). The operation skips T R+2 . We define a series of partial executions each of which can be extended to wr. Let wr R+2 be the partial run in which w has invoked the write and has sent the write message to all processes, and all write messages are in transit. For 1 ≤ i ≤ R+1, we define wr i as the partial run which contains an incomplete operation
We make the following simple observations: (1) for 1 ≤ i ≤ R, wr i and wr i+1 differ only at servers in T i ∪ B i , (2) wr is an extension of wr 1 , such that, in wr, w receives the replies (that are in transit in wr 1 ) and the write completes, and hence, (3) wr and wr 1 differ only at w. Appending reads. Partial run pr 1 extends wr by having block B 1 failing upon completion of write (1) and appending a complete read by r 1 that skips block T 1 (Fig. 6.2(a) ). B 1 fails in such a way that it behaves as if it never received any write message (i.e., a message from operation write(1)). We say that B 1 fails and loses its memory. Observe that r 1 cannot distinguish pr 1 from some partial run pr 1 , that extends wr 2 by appending a complete read by r 1 that skips T 1 . To see why, notice that (a) wr and wr 2 differ at w and at blocks T 1 and B 1 , (b) r 1 does not receive any message from writer w and block T 1 in both executions and (c) r 1 received the same message from block B 1 in both executions. By wait-freedom property and since w can fail by crashing, r 1 's read in pr 1 must return some value x, since it cannot wait for the completion of the writer's invocation, nor a message from w. Since r 1 cannot distinguish pr 1 from pr 1 , r 1 returns the same value x in pr 1 as well, and by atomicity, in pr 1 , x must equal 1. Therefore, in pr 1 , r 1 also returns 1.
Starting from pr 1 , we iteratively define the following partial executions for 2 ≤ i ≤ R. Partial run pr i extends pr i−1 by: (1) block B i failing in such a way that it behaves as if it never received any message (loses memory) and (2) appending a complete read by r i that skips T i . Partial run pr i is constructed by deleting from pr i all steps of the servers in block T i and all steps of servers in block B i up to the instant in which B i lost its memory (including that particular step). Since the last read in pr i by reader r i skips block T i , r i cannot distinguish pr i from pr i , as in both executions r i receives the same messages from B i . More precisely, partial run pr i T1   B1   B2   T3   B3   T4   B4   T5   T2   r1  r3  r2 r1 r1
(e) pr D 000 000 000 111 111 111 00 00 00 00 11 11 11 11 00 00 11 11 00 00 00 11 11 11 00 00 00 11 11 11 non−malicious block that replies to the first read of r1, but r1 does not receive replies malicious block that replies to the first read of r1 and r1 receives the replies non−malicious block that replies to the first read of r1 and r1 receives the replies non−malicious block that replies to the second read of r1 and r1 receives the replies malicious block that replies to the second read of r1 and r1 receives the replies (f) Legend read that skips T i . Here, the first i − 1 appended reads are incomplete whereas the last one is complete. Figure 6 .2 depicts block diagrams of pr i and pr i with R = 3.
(The deletion of steps to obtain pr i from pr i is shown by crossing out the rectangles corresponding to the deleted steps.) Reader r 1 's read in pr 1 returns 1. By wait-freedom, in pr 2 r 2 must return some value, say x 2 . However, since r 2 cannot distinguish pr 2 from pr 2 , r 2 must return a value x 2 in pr 2 as well. Since pr 2 extends pr 1 , by atomicity, r 2 's read in pr 2 must return x 2 = 1. Therefore, r 2 's read in pr 2 returns 1. In general, since pr i extends pr i−1 , and r i cannot distinguish pr i from pr i (for all i such that 2 ≤ i ≤ R), in which it must return a value, it follows by trivial induction that r i 's read in pr i returns 1. In particular, r R reads 1 in pr R . Moreover, note that in pr R no object is faulty.
Partial run pr
A . Consider again partial run pr R , i.e., partial run wr R+1 extended by appending R reads by each reader
, whereas a read by reader r R skips T R only. The read by r 1 is incomplete in pr R : only servers in B 1 , T R+1 , B R+1 and T R+2 send replies to r 1 , and those reply messages are in transit. Observe that, in pr R , only servers in T R+1 and B R+1 receive the write message from write (1) . Consider the following partial run pr A which differs from pr R in the following: 1. Upon reception of message from write(1) operation, B R+1 fails arbitrarily in such a way that, from that point on, it sends replies to all processes but r 1 as if it was not faulty, and to r 1 as if it never received a write(1) message. Moreover, after completion of read by r R , 2. r 1 receives the readack messages from T R+2 and B 1 (that were in transit in pr R ) and B R+1 (i.e., from the Byzantine faulty objects), 3. servers in T 1 to T R and B 2 to B R receive the read message from r 1 (that were in transit in pr R ) and reply to r 1 , and 4. reader r 1 receives these replies from servers in T 1 to T R and B 2 to B R , and then r 1 returns from the read invocation. Notice that r 1 received replies from all blocks but T R+1 , and so, must return from the read; however, r 1 does not receive the replies from servers in T R+1 , i.e., from the only benign servers whose state was modified by write(1).
B . Consider another partial run pr B with the same communication pattern as pr A , except that write (1) is not invoked at all and block B R+1 is not faulty. Hence, servers in T R+1 do not receive any write message (Figure 6.3) . Clearly, only servers in T R+1 , B R+1 , the writer, and the readers r 2 to r R can distinguish pr A from pr B . Reader r 1 cannot distinguish the two partial executions because it does not receive any message from the servers in T R+1 , the writer, or other readers and it receives the same message from the servers in B R+1 in both executions. By atomicity, r 1 Proof. It is sufficient to show the impossibility in a system where W = R = 2, and t = 1. Let the writers be w 1 and w 2 , and the readers be r 1 and r 2 . Let s 1 to s S be the servers. Suppose by contradiction that there is a fast implementation of an atomic register in this system. To show the desired contradiction, we construct a series of runs, each consisting of two writes followed by a read.
Since the writer, any number of readers, and up to t servers might crash in our model, the invoking process can only wait for reply messages from S −t servers. Given that we assume a fast implementation, on receiving a read (or a write) message, the servers cannot wait for messages from other processes, before replying to the read (or the write) message. We can thus construct partial runs of a fast implementation such that only read (or write) messages from the invoking processes to the servers, and the replies from servers to the invoking processes, are delivered in those partial runs. All other messages remain in transit. In particular, no server receives any message from other servers, and no invoking process receives any message from other invoking processes. In our proof, we only construct such partial runs.
We say that a complete operation op skips a server s i in a partial run if every server distinct from s i receives the read or the write message from op and replies to that message, op receives those replies and returns, and all other messages are in transit. In other words, only s i does not receive read or write message from op. Since t = 1, any complete operation may skip at most one server. If a complete operation does not skip any servers, we say that the operation is skip-free.
Consider a partial run run 1 constructed with the following three non-concurrent operations: (1) a skip-free write(2) by w 2 , that precedes (2) a skip-free write(1) by w 1 , that in turn precedes (3) a skip-free read() by r 1 . From property P1, the read returns 1.
We now construct a similar partial run run 2 in which the order of the two writes are interchanged: (1) a skip-free write(1) by w 1 , that precedes (2) a skip-free write(2) by w 2 , that in turn precedes (3) a skip-free read() by r 1 . From property P1, the read returns 2.
Consider a series of partial runs run i , where i varies from 1 to S + 1. We define run 1 to be run 1 To see why the above proof does not apply to the single writer case, observe that in most partial runs in the above proof, the two writes are concurrent. However, in our system model, a process can invoke at most one operation at a time. Thus we cannot construct partial runs with concurrent writes in the single-writer case.
Related Work.
A seminal SWMR crash-tolerant atomic register implementation assuming a majority of correct processes, known as ABD, was presented by Attiya, Bar-Noy and Dolev in [4] . In ABD, all write operations are fast; however, read operations always take two communication round trips between a client and servers. In this paper, we show that having fast read operation in a SWMR atomic implementation is possible, yet it comes with a somewhat steep price -a limited number of readers.
In [20, 10] , ABD was extended to quorum system-based implementations of MWMR atomic register. In both these MWMR implementations, a read or write operation requires at least two rounds trips. In [23] , Lynch and Shvartsman implement a MWMR register in a dynamic system, where processes can join or leave the set of servers implementing the register. However, even in executions where no process joins or leaves the set of server, a read or write operation in [23] requires at least two round-trips. Thus, the time-complexities of these implementations are consistent with our result on the impossibility of fast MWMR implementations when servers may fail.
Our results adapt the classical theorem "atomic reads must write", stated in a shared-memory context [18, 5] , to a message-passing context. In particular, to simulate a multi-reader atomic register from single-reader atomic registers, at least one of the readers must write into some single-reader register [5] . A similar result appears in the context of atomic register implementations over weaker regular ones [18] . Namely, in such atomic register implementations, a process that reads a value v also needs to write it, in order to make sure that no other process will subsequently read an older value v , which is possible when reading from regular registers.
Assuming a message-passing system, Fan and Lynch show [11] that every atomic read must modify the state of at least t servers, which might be interpreted as a need for a second communication round-trip. However, in such a system, any message received by a server can potentially modify the server's state. Hence, even in one round-trip, a read can modify at least S − t > t servers (assuming a majority of correct servers).
There is a prolific line of research in Byzantine fault tolerant atomic register implementations in message-passing systems, e.g., [24, 25, 6, 14, 3, 15] , with a typical focus on providing optimal resilience (in our model, this amounts to S = 2t + b + 1 servers [25] ). The work of Malkhi and Reiter [24] casts the ABD algorithm to the MWMR Byzantine context, featuring both two round-trip writes and two round-trip reads, using writer's digital signatures, which we also use in the Byzantine-tolerant version of our implementation. A MWMR implementation by Martin et al. [25] introduces the "Listeners" pattern in which readers, roughly speaking, subscribe to updates from servers. Like in [25] , in our implementation readers modify the servers' states, but receive no updates since this would, intuitively, violate the requirement for a fast implementation. Cachin and Tessaro propose in [6] a Byzantine-tolerant variant of Rabin's information dispersal algorithm [27] to minimize the storage blowup inherent to data replication. To this end, a MWMR implementation of [6] relies on communication among servers which, in a sense, prohibits fast operations. SWMR implementations that allow fast "best-case" read/write operations, i.e., operations that execute in synchronous periods, with few failures and no read/write concurrency, were presented in [14, 15] . In contrast, in this paper we consider the problem of allowing all operations to be fast while assuming the general, unrestricted asynchronous system. Not surprisingly, our limitations related to the number of readers are incurred by worst-case interleaving among different, concurrent operations, with roots in asynchrony and (possible) failures. Note that [14, 15] as well as the MWMR implementation of Aiyer et al. [3] , renounce digital signatures. In this light, it is important to note that the existence of fast Byzantine-resilient atomic register implementations that do not rely on digital signatures remains an open problem.
After the appearance of the preliminary version of this work [8] , several papers extended the notion of fast implementations. For SWMR implementations where the servers can only fail by crashing, Georgiu et al. propose in [13] how to circumvent our fast implementation lower bound (R < S t − 2) by permitting some reads that are not fast (called slow reads). More specifically, in the semi-fast implementation of [13] , the readers are grouped into virtual nodes where readers in the same node possess the same virtual identifiers. Then, as long as there are at most S t − 2 virtual identifiers in the system (irrespective of the number of readers), most read operations are fast (and there is at most one slow read operation per write operation). In [12] , the same authors investigate quorum system-based fast and semi-fast implementations. The paper shows that for robust quorum systems (i.e., quorum systems that remains available when one of the servers fails) and in presence of arbitrary number of readers, it is impossible to implement fast or semi-fast SWMR registers. The paper then presents a weak-semifast implementation that allows multiple slow read operations per write operation. In a recent work [9] , Englert et al. investigate the possibility of MWMR implementations where most operations are fast, by assigning some additional responsibilities at server for ordering operations.
Thus, our results in this paper have initiated a line of work that investigates the trade-off between the efficiency of atomic register implementations and the bounds on the number of readers and writers. This is not surprising since: a) atomic read/write registers are seen as a fundamental abstraction in building practical distributed storage and file systems (see e.g., [30, 29] ) and b) our results demonstrate a fundamental limitation on the number of readers that an asynchronous fast SWMR atomic implementations can support, as well as the impossibility of fast MWMR atomic implementations. In a sense, the line of research that stems from our work seeks for practically applicable atomic register implementations by circumventing our results, while possibly allowing for some operations to be fast.
9. Summary. This paper establishes the exact conditions required for a fast implementation (an implementation in which all operations complete in a single roundtrip) of an atomic read-write data structure, also called a register.
In the case of multiple writers, we proved that a fast implementation is impossible even if only one server can fail, and it can only do by crashing.
In the case of a single-writer where t out of S servers can fail by crashing, the number of readers must be smaller than S/t − 2. In the general arbitrary failure model, this number must be smaller than (S + b)/(t + b) − 2 where up to b out of t servers can be malicious.
Finally, it would be interesting to look into optimal register implementations with respect to other complexity metrics (e.g., message complexity). This is left as future work.
